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For some entities, such as  self-employed indi-
viduals reporting income taxes or firms report-
ing  value-added taxes, the optimal evasion rate 
depends substantially on audit features like audit 
probabilities and penalty rates (Allingham and 
Sandmo 1972).
Whereas it is easy for firms to find other 
important information such as inflation rates or 
exchange rates, it is difficult to find information 
about the probability of being audited and pen-
alty rates. Indeed, Bérgolo et al. (2017) show 
evidence that firms have large misperceptions 
about these audit features.1 In this paper, we 
1 Previous studies have used surveys to measure misper-
ceptions about audit probabilities (e.g., US Department 
of Treasury 1988; Hessing et al. 1992; Sheffrin and Triest 
1992). The evidence from Bérgolo et al. (2017) has two 
main advantages. First, compared to previous surveys that 
use samples of the general population, Bérgolo et al. (2017) 
focus on a  population whose stakes of misperceiving the 
auditing process can be substantial. Second, Bérgolo et al. 
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expand their analysis to explore the sources of 
these misperceptions.
I. Data
See Bérgolo et al. (2017) for details about the 
survey design and implementation. In a nutshell, 
the anonymous online survey was conducted in 
collaboration with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from Uruguay. The invitations were sent 
by email on May 2016 to a sample of 6,181 
firms with valid email addresses—whereas 
Bérgolo et al. (2017) focuses on firms partic-
ipating in a field experiment, we extend the 
analysis to a broader sample. The average firm 
invited to the survey had 5.24 employees, had 
been in existence for 14 years, and paid $7,887 
in  value-added taxes and $5,265 in other taxes 
over the previous year.2
Of the 6,181 firms invited to the survey, 3,628 (59 percent) responded. By request of the IRS, 
responses to all survey questions were volun-
tary. Across all questions, the average share of 
missing responses is 52 percent.
One question elicited the perceived proba-
bility of being audited: “In your opinion, what 
is the probability that the tax returns filed by a 
company like yours will be audited at least in 
one of the next three years (from 0% to 100%)?” 
(2017) combine survey and internal administrative data from 
the tax agency, which provides a more straightforward com-
parison of perceptions and reality. 
2 All monetary amounts are expressed in USD, converted 
from the original Uruguayan pesos using the exchange rate 
from August 23, 2015. This sample draws heavily from 
small and medium firms. In the universe of firms, the aver-
age number of employees is 10.40, the average age is 13.45 
years, and the payment is $19.800 in  value-added taxes and 
$10,943 in other taxes. 
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We used a  three-year period, because when 
selected for an audit, IRS investigates the firm’s 
activity over the past three years. Another ques-
tion elicited the perceived penalty rate: “Let us 
imagine that a company like yours is audited 
and that tax evasion is detected. What, in your 
opinion, is the penalty (in %) as determined 
by law that the firm must pay in addition to the 
originally unpaid amount? For example, a fee of 
X% means that, for each $100 not paid, the firm 
would have to pay those original $100 plus $X 
in penalties.” After each question, we elicited 
certainty in the response using a 1-to-5 scale, 
from “Not sure at all” to “Very sure.”
To estimate the “actual” audit probability and 
penalty rate, we use administrative data from the 
IRS for the sample of firms invited to the sur-
vey. The actual audit probability is calculated as 
the percentage of firms that were audited at least 
once in 2011–2013. The average penalty rate is 
calculated among firms who were caught evad-
ing in 2011–2013.
II. Average Misperceptions
Figure 1 shows a histogram of the distribution 
of perceived audit probability among the sur-
vey respondents. The vertical line corresponds 
to the actual value of audit probability among 
the firms invited to the survey. Figure 1 suggests 
that most of the firms misperceive the audit 
probability. Moreover, there is a systematic 
positive Bias: the average perceived probability (39.50 percent) is substantially higher than real-
ity (7.98 percent), with a statistically significant 
difference ( p < 0.001).
One potential explanation for this overestima-
tion of audit probability is given by the avail-
ability heuristic model (Kahneman and Tversky 
1974): audits are arguably salient events and 
thus seem more frequent than they are.
Figure 2 provides the same analysis as 
Figure 1, using perceived penalty rates instead of 
perceived audit probabilities. Again, most firms 
misperceive the average penalty rate. However, 
there is no systematic Bias in perceived penalty 
rates. The average perceived penalty (31.37 per-
cent) is close to the actual average (31.91 per-
cent), with a statistically insignificant difference ( p = 0.462).
III. Heterogeneity Analysis
In this section, we present some heteroge-
neity analyses to explore the sources of these 
misperceptions. Table 1 summarizes the misper-
ceptions using two measures. Panel A shows the 
results for the entire sample. Bias corresponds to 
the average difference between perceptions and 
reality. MAE, which stands for mean absolute 
error, corresponds to the average absolute differ-
ence between perceptions and reality.
First, we explore whether these mispercep-
tions are driven primarily by less sophisticated 
Figure 1. Perceived Audit Probability
Notes: N = 1,791. The bars represent the distribution of sur-
vey responses. The vertical line is the actual probability of 
being audited.
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Figure 2. Perceived Penalty Rate
Notes: N = 1,671. The bars represent the distribution of sur-
vey responses. The vertical line is the actual penalty rate.
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agents, who either do not have access to the rele-
vant information or have no interest in accessing 
it. To explore this hypothesis, we exploit survey 
data on the  self-identification of respondents.
Panel B of Table 1 breaks down the results by 
accountants (supposed experts on the topic) and 
 non-accountants. Although some differences 
are statistically significant, the differences in 
misperceptions (as measured by Bias or MAE) 
are economically small across accountants and 
 non-accountants, and the direction of these dif-
ferences is not robust. This evidence refutes the 
hypothesis that less sophisticated agents drive 
most misperceptions.
The presence of misperceptions does not nec-
essarily imply that firms are irrational. If the cost 
of searching for information is high enough, 
rational inattention models would predict some 
misperceptions. Given that this is a  high-stakes 
environment where the average firm in the sam-
ple pays about $13,152 in taxes per year, ratio-
nal inattention does not seem like a plausible 
explanation.
To provide more direct evidence on the ratio-
nal inattention channel, panel C of Table 1 
breaks down the results by number of employ-
ees. Firms with fewer than two employees pay 
an average of $8,921 in taxes per year, whereas 
firms with two or more employees pay an aver-
age of $16,855. According to the rational inat-
tention model, larger firms should have smaller 
misperceptions, because their stakes are higher. 
Although some differences are statistically sig-
nificant, the differences in misperceptions are 
small across smaller and larger firms. For exam-
ple, the MAE in perceived probability is 35.27 
for larger firms and 35.05 for smaller firms ( p = 0.885). Thus, we find no suggestive evi-
dence of rational inattention.
If a firm does not have access to other infor-
mation sources, it may have to rely on its own 
history of audits as the main source of informa-
tion. Panel D provides one test of this hypoth-
esis by breaking down the results by firm age. 
Intuitively, older firms have more time than 
newer ones to gather information about the audit-
ing process. Again, although some differences 
are statistically significant, the differences in 
misperceptions between older and younger firms 
are economically small. This evidence indicates 
that misperceptions can persist for decades.
Panel E provides related evidence by com-
paring firms that were audited at least once in 
Table 1—Results by Subgroups of Respondents
Audit probability Penalty
Bias MAE N Bias MAE N
Panel A. All
31.53 33.26 1,791 −0.54 23.59 1,671
 (0.643)  (0.592)  (0.736)  (0.457)
Panel B. By occupation of respondent
Accountants 33.80 35.13 331 −0.56 22.50 314
 (1.531)  (1.437)  (1.631)  (1.022)
Non-accountants 31.05 32.80 1,370 −0.39 23.88 1,278
 (0.729)  (0.670)  (0.851)  (0.527)
Panel C. By size
>1 employee 32.95 35.27 605 0.89 22.79 565
 (1.066)  (0.935)  (1.252)  (0.804)
≤1 employee 34.34 35.05 527 −4.36 24.15 483
 (1.207)  (1.167)  (1.317)  (0.752)
Panel D. By age of the firm
> = 12 years 30.50 32.22 807 −1.37 22.99 755
 (0.918)  (0.842)  (1.068)  (0.664)
< 12 years 32.78 34.52 716 −0.168 23.92 668
 (1.051)  (0.970)  (1.181)  (0.733)
Panel E. By history of audits
Audited 11–13 46.43 47.06 209 3.24 24.74 188
 (1.773)  (1.691)  (2.364)  (1.539)
Not-audited 29.10 31.02 1,397 −1.27 23.34 1,307
 11–13  (0.706)  (0.645)  (0.819)  (0.504)
Panel F. By Tax morale
High tax morale 32.72 34.38 1,010 1.80 25.02 965
(0.849) (0.782) (1.027) (0.639)
Low tax morale 28.39 30.12 583 −4.17 20.67 554
(1.089) (1.006) (1.102) (0.688)
Panel G. By degree of confidence in response
High confidence 31.96 34.88 760 0.49 25.12 879
 (1.118)  (1.075)  (1.081)  (0.671)
Low confidence 31.06 31.91 1,016 −1.58 21.92 787
 (0.694)  (0.655)  (0.991)  (0.611)
Panel H. By responses equal or different from 50
Exactly 50 42.03 42.03 652 18.09 18.09 212
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Not exactly 50 25.52 28.24 1,139 −3.25 24.39 1,459
 (0.967)  (0.592)  (0.820)  (0.521)
Notes: Bias is the average difference between perception. 
MAE is the average absolute difference between perception 
and reality. N is the total number of non-missing responses. 
For all panels but C and H, we compare the survey responses 
to the same estimates of actual probability (7.97 percent) 
and average penalty rate (31.91 percent). In panels C and 
H, the actual values of the parameters are computed by 
 subgroups. In panel C, small firms have an actual probabil-
ity of being audited of 3.47 percent and an average penalty 
rate of 34.12 percent; large firms have an actual probability of 
being audited of 11.92 percent and an average penalty rate of 
31.33 percent. In panel H, older firms have an actual proba-
bility of being audited of 8.93 percent and an average penalty 
of 31.99 percent; newer firms have an actual audit probabil-
ity of 6.97 percent and an average penalty of 31.80 percent.
Source: Author calculations based on survey and adminis-
trative data.
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the previous three years and firms that were 
not. Consistent with the hypothesis that firms 
use their own audit histories as their main data 
sources, firms recently audited have higher per-
ceived audit probabilities. This effect results in 
a higher Bias for firms with recent audit history (46.43 versus 29.10, p < 0.001) and a higher 
MAE (47.06 versus 31.02, p < 0.001). The 
results for the perceived penalty rate go in the 
same direction, but the differences are economi-
cally and statistically less significant. This find-
ing suggests that this channel at least partially 
explains how direct contact with audits plays 
an important role in misperceptions about audit 
probabilities.
Some firms might pay their taxes because they 
think it is the right thing to do. For these firms, 
audits are irrelevant to their  decision-making, 
and thus they have no incentive to be informed 
about the auditing process. According to this 
view, misperceptions may be driven exclu-
sively by firms with high tax morale. To test 
this hypothesis, we use responses to a survey 
question that measures tax morale: “On a 
Scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is ‘Not justifiable at 
all’ and 5 is ‘Completely justifiable,’ how much 
do you think it is justifiable to evade taxes?” 
Panel F breaks down the results by high morale (value 1 in the score) and low morale (values 
2 to 5). Consistent with this hypothesis, firms 
with higher tax morale have higher Bias and 
higher MAE than firms with lower tax morale. 
However, although these differences are statis-
tically significant, they are moderate in mag-
nitude. For example, the difference in MAE 
regarding audit probability is 34.38 versus 
30.12 ( p < 0.001).
We also explore whether firms are  self-aware 
of their misperceptions by looking at the 
 self-reported confidence in responses. When 
asked about audit probabilities, 42.60 percent of 
subjects reported to be sure or very sure about 
their answers, whereas 57.40 percent of subjects 
reported to be a little sure or not sure at all. The 
distribution of confidence is similar for the per-
ceived audit penalty. In other words, firms are 
aware of their misperceptions from a collective 
perspective.
To further explore this question, panel G of 
Table 1 splits the results by firms that reported 
 high-versus-low confidence in their responses. 
We find that, despite some statistically sig-
nificant differences in misperceptions, these 
 differences are economically small and point in 
the opposite direction than predicted.
Last, we address a confounding factor. It is 
possible that misperceptions are spuriously 
driven by firms that responded exactly 50 per-
cent as a way of expressing that they are uncer-
tain (Bruine de Bruin and Carman 2012).3
Since misperceptions are similar between 
firms that are certain and firms that are uncer-
tain, this confounding factor seems unlikely to 
account for the findings. As additional evidence, 
panel H breaks down the results by firms that 
responded exactly 50 percent and firms that 
did not. By construction, the Bias and MAE are 
higher for firms reporting 50 percent. However, 
the misperceptions are still substantial even 
after dropping responses of 50 percent. In other 
words, although this issue with the survey 
responses may inflate the degree of mispercep-
tions, it is far from explaining the whole puzzle.
IV. Conclusions
We present measures of perceptions about the 
auditing process in a sample of 6,181 firms from 
Uruguay. We find large misperceptions about 
audit probabilities and penalty rates. We also 
find a systematic overestimation of audit prob-
abilities but no such overestimation for penalty 
rates. Of all the channels that we explore, recent 
contact with audits best explains differences in 
misperceptions.
These findings have direct policy implica-
tions. The high level of misperceptions may be 
attributed to the lack of publicly available and 
easily accessible information about the auditing 
process. Our results suggest that if tax author-
ities were more transparent about the auditing 
process, perceived audit probabilities would 
decrease, which could in turn reduce tax com-
pliance. Thus, it may be in the best interest of 
tax agencies to reduce transparency. Indeed, this 
may be why tax authorities do not share this 
information.
3 For instance, among firms that report an audit proba-
bility of 50 percent, the fraction that report “Not sure” or 
“A bit sure” is 50.92 percent; in comparison, among firms 
that report an audit probability different from 50 percent, the 
fraction that reports “Not sure” or “A bit sure” is 29.06 per-
cent. This difference is statistically significant ( p < 0.001). 
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